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Abstract
In most studies on individual labor market transitions, the search process
leading to job offers is a black box. In this paper we specify and estimate a
search model that distinguishes between formal (applications) and informal
(referrals) search methods. Job offers can be obtained by either method,
and the corresponding wage offer distributions are allowed to differ. The
model allows for search during unemployment as well as search on the job.
We conclude that  al though the method by which jobs are found varies
considerably with education and occupation, the use of a particular search
method does not result in a higher wage. Moreover, individuals who have
an advantage in informal search do not find a job more rapidly, which
casts doubt on the hypothesis that the search method is freely chosen by
the searcher by comparing costs and returns.
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1 Introduction
The job search of individuals in the labor market involves a number of choices.
Blau and Robins (1990) distinguish four components: the choice of the search
method, the effort devoted to each search method, which firms to contact first,
and the choice of acceptance criterion. Together these four components determine
the job finding rate. However, most studies of the search behavior of workers sim-
ply assume that wage offers arrive according to an exogenous stochastic process
and that wage offers are random drawings from a given wage offer distribution.
Standard job search theory reduces the decision problem of a job searcher to
the choice of a reservation wage. This study looks inside the black box of the
search process using a structural model in which the job searcher employs two
search methods: workers can receive job offers either by direct application to an
employer or by referral by an(other)  employed person. Associated with these two
types of offers are two distinct wage offer distributions. A test of the equality
of these distributions is an important contribution of this paper. In the sequel
we refer to these search methods as the formal (application) and the informal
(referral) search method.
The use of different sources of information is one of the key elements in the
search process of individuals. However, little effort has been made to incorporate
multiple information sources in a structural model. Holzer (1988) argues that
costs (time and effort spent on searching) as well as benefits (effectiveness of
search; the number of acceptable job offers) play a role in the choice of search
method. In general, the costs are at the expense of current income, while the ben-
efits are in terms of higher expected future income. It is argued that the money
and time costs associated with referral by other workers are low in comparison to
the costs associated with formal applications. From the point of view of the em-
ployer, informal search may be more effective than formal search, because they
consider referrals from their workers as more reliable than direct applications.
Employees have an incentive to refer well-qualified workers, since they feel re-
sponsible for the applicants. Hence referral helps in solving the selection problem
of the employer. Montgomery (1991) d evelops a selection model in which the net-
work density of a worker plays a crucial role in determining his/her labor market
outcomes. Montgomery argues that informal search generates higher profits for
firms, and that wages of workers with an extensive social network are higher,
* because they are more likely to be referred by other workers.
Even if applicants have the same productivity, in equilibrium wage offers ob-
tained by informal search may be higher than those obtained by formal search.
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Mortensen and Vishwanath (1993, 1994) d evelop an equilibrium search model
with a formal and an informal search channel. In this model, employed workers
search on the job for jobs with higher wages, so that in equilibrium firms paying
high wages also have a relatively large workforce. If a worker searches by way
of referral by currently employed workers, then the probability that of getting
an offer of a particular firm is proportional to the size of that firm. If a worker
searches by way of applications then sampling of firms is uniform. Hence, search-
ing by contacting workers instead of firms generates higher wage offers. As a
result, individuals who have access to informal search channels will earn a higher
wage, even if they are equally productive as individuals without access to the
informal channel.
There is a substantial descriptive literature on job offer arrival rates and labor
market transitions of employed and unemployed workers. In this literature, data
on search methods, like the number of methods used, are sometimes used as an
indicator for the search intensity of job seekers (e.g. Holzer (1988)).  Using Dutch
data, Lindeboom, Van Ours and Renes (1994) find that: (1) The majority of job
seekers uses both formal and informal methods. (2) Employed workers have a
higher job offer arrival rate than unemployed workers (Blau and Robins (1990)
obtain the same conclusion with US data), and (3) Informal wage offers have a
relatively large conditional acceptance probability. The latter result is also found
by Holzer (1988). Finally,  Thomas (1996) estimates a competing risks model in
which the job finding rate of unemployed job seekers differs between random and
selective search. His results indicate that those individuals who search selectively
have shorter unemployment spells than those who search randomly.
None of these empirical studies addresses the extent to which different chan-
nels result in jobs with different wages. As such, they provide incomplete de-
scriptions of the effects of using different search methods. Wage differentials by
search method are important because they provide a reason for why job seekers
would prefer a particular search method. If wage differentials are absent then the
relative cost and the number of job offers are the only relevant characteristics of
the search methods. Such information is useful for policy purposes, for example
for an evaluation of the efficiency of subsidies that are allocated to stimulate the
use of a particular method.
In this paper, we specify and estimate a structural job search model in which
job seekers employ formal and informal search methods. The model allows for
search during unemployment as well as search on the job, and we estimate the
model with longitudinal data on individual wages, transitions between individual
labor states, and durations spent in those states. In the model, the distribution of
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Iwage offers is allowed to depend on the search method that was used to find the
corresponding job offer. This provides a direct test of models that predict that the
distributions for different search methods do not coincide (Montgomery (1991),
Mortensen and Vishwa.nath (1993)). Such a test is hampered by the fact that we
only observe accepted wages. It is well-known that equality of the distributions of
accepted wages does not imply equality of the wage offer distributions. We should
stress that the theoretical models in the studies above are such that in equilibrium
the unemployed workers always accept all wage offers, so that these distributions
coincide. A necessary assumption for this is that workers are homogeneous in
terms of their opportunity costs of employment. However, in this paper we do
not impose such equilibrium models from the outset, and we do not want to rule
out in advance that (some) workers reject low wage offers.
This means that we have to make inferences on the difference between two
wage offer distributions even though we do not have data on rejected wage offers.
We deal with this problem in a number of ways. For example, we show that the
sign of the relation between differences in mean a.ccepted  wages and differences
in acceptance probabilities is unambiguous for a wide class of probability dis-
tributions. In the empirical analysis, we specify our structural model in terms
of identified distributions and transition intensities.’ As a consequence, our em-
pirical structural model makes minima.1 assumptions on the search strategy of
unemployed workers. In particular, we do not require that the reservation wage
of the unemployed satisfies the Bellman equation for the optimal strategy. The
Bellman equation is used in the second stage of our estimation procedure to esti-
mate the discount rate. In the second stage it is also possible to test whether the
lowest observed wages are significantly larger than the theoretically predicted op-
timal reservation wage, in order to test whether all wage offers are acceptable, i.e.
whether the distribution of accepted wages coincides with the wage offer distri-
bution. Another test on the same hypothesis exploits variation of unemployment
benefits levels across individuals. Finally, we test whether the use of a search
method is sensitive to one of the components of its cost.
Our conclusion is that the two search methods considered in this study do
not generate wage offers that are significantly different. Moreover, individuals
with a relatively low cost of using referrals do not find jobs more rapidly by
‘This is an innovation with respect to the traditional approach in structural estimation of job
search models (see Wolpin (1987) and Van den Berg (1990b)  for examples). In the literature,
job offer arrival rates and wage offer distributions are estimated as structural determinants.
However, the estimates are sensitive to ad-hoc functional form assumptions on the shape of the
wage offer distribution.
the informal sea.&  method. Hence, when analyzing the search behavior of the
employed and unemployed, the distinction between formal and informal search is
largely irrelevant.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we specify the theoreti-
cal model. Section 3 discusses the data. Identification issues and the empirical
implementation of the model are considered in Section 4. Section 5 contains the
estimation results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 T h e  m o d e l
2.1 The basic model
The model is based on the standard job search model with on-the-job search
(see e.g. Mortensen (1986)). We g eneralize the model by distinguishing between
formal and informal search channels that have distinct wage offer distributions
and offer arrival rates.
Individuals maximize their expected discounted income over an infinite time
horizon. Income is equal to the benefit level b  for unemployed individuals and
to the current wage UI  for employed individuals. Wage offers are obtained by
the formal and informal search method at a rate of, respectively, X,,  and X,,
while unemployed, and X,.  and X,, while employed. The corresponding wage
offers are random drawings from (absolutely continuous) distributions with c.d.f.
F and G, respectively, that are assumed to be identical for the unemployed and
the employed. The employed are laid off at rate 6. In the sequel, the subscripts
u, e are used to distinguish between the unemployed and the employed, and the
subscripts f,g  to make a distinction between the formal and informal search
methods.
All parameters and distributions are assumed to be constant over time. The
optimal strategy of an unemployed individual is characterized by a reservation
wage T that satisfies
pR = b + Im [W(x)  - R] (X,&F(z)  + &&G(4) (1)l-
where W(w)  denotes the expected present value of holding a job with wage w,
R denotes the expected present value of being unemployed, and p denotes the
. discount rate.
In the absence of fixed costs associated with job-to-job mobility, the optimal
strategy of an employed individua,l  is to accept a wage offer if and only if it
5
exceeds his current wa.ge.  Thus the income flow of being employed at wage w is
pW(w)  = w+jm  [W(x)  -  r;V(w)]  (X&‘(a) + X,,dG(s)) +6 [R -  W(w)](2)w
Differentiating this expression with respect to w (technicalities are similar to
those in the basic model; see e.g. Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang (1991)),  we get
1
w’(w)  = p + s + A,,F(  w) + x,,q w) (3)
w h e r e
F(w)  = I_ F(w),
I  = 1 _ G(w)
(4)
The denominator of equation (3) can be interpreted as the rate at which the value
of a job is discounted. It is the sum of the discount rate and the job leaving rate.
The expected discounted value of holding a job with wage T,  W(r),  is equal to
the expected discounted value of being unemployed, R. Evaluating (2) in r and
using the resulting expression and (1) to eliminate r, we obtain
r=b+ ~,,ww + GLg - ~egW(4)
Partial integration and substitution of (3) gives
(5)
J O"r=b+ vu, - ~,fFb) + (AL, - ~,,mdwt p + 6 + X,fF(W)  + x,C(w) (6)
If both X,,  = X,,  and X,,  = Xeg,  then individuals are indifferent between search-
ing while unemployed or employed, and the reservation wage is equal to the
benefits level. If the arrival rates while employed exceed those while unemployed,
the unemployed accept wages below the level of unemployment benefits.
The unemployed may find a job by either the formal or the informal search
method. The transition rates equal the product of the corresponding arrival rates
and the acceptance probabilities
84 = XJqr)
9 “9 = XugG(r) (7)
.
The rate at which the unemployed find a job, denoted by 8,,  is equal to the sum
of these transition rates. In the same way, the transition rates for an employee
who holds a job with wage w are
6
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and the job leaving rate, e,(w), is the sum of these transition rates and 6.
The comparative statics for this extension of the job search model with on-
the-job search are simi1a.r  to those for the original model. We consider the semi-
elasticity of r and the job finding and leaving rates with respect to the fraction
of job offers that are obtained through the informal channel
x ks
Qk = A,, + A,, (9)
with I;  = u,  e. These semi-elasticities can be written as
d l n r d l n r JO”- = (gb Aid% G(x)  - F(z) dsr p+S+8,(x) (10)
~lnw4  = G(w)  -F(w)
8% (1 - a,)F(  w) + a$(  20)
(11)
a 1x18 C(r)  -  F(r) dlnr8,
2 = (1 -  a,)F(r)  + cr,C(r)  + dlnrd% d a ,
(12)
Because the semi-elasticity of r with respect to b  is positive, the semi-elasticity
with respect to ay,  is also positive if G first order stochastically dominates F for
w > r. The semi-elasticity of the job leaving rate is positive for wages where the
same relation holds between F and G. Because an increase in r decreases the
job finding rate for the unemployed, stochastic dominance is not sufficient for a
positive semi-elasticity of the job finding. All semi-elasticities are 0 if F = G.
The elasticity of the job finding rate while employed is positive for all w if
G first order stochastically dominates F. It is zero if the two distributions are
equal.
2.2 Endogenous search method
* Until now we have assumed that the channel by which job offers arrive is ex-
ogenous. We now consider the case that the search method is chosen by the job
seekers. To be specific, we assume that the arrival rates are under control of the
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job seeker, and that search costs increase with the arrival rates.2 For convenience,
we do not consider the decision whether to search or not in detail. We focus on
optimal behavior of those who search. In obvious notation we specify that search
costs equal
%I = %t4dJ (13)
with k = u,e  and h = f,g,  and
Ckh  = 0, C;h  > 0, C;h  > 0 (14)
For the unemployed the search costs are cUf(  A,,)  + cUg(  AUs),  and for the employed
they are  cef(X,,)  + ceg(Xeg).  If th e search costs do not depend on the arrival rates,
then (6) still holds if we subtract cuf  + cUg -  cef  -  c,~ from b.
Introducing search costs in the equations (1) and (2),  we obtain the following
first order conditions, which hold in ca,se  of an interior solution for A,,
cI,(L,) = JI_ [W(5) - R]  dF(z) (15)
(17)
(18)
These equations set the marginal cost of a change in the arrival rate equal to its
marginal return. Note that in general A,, depends on all structural parameters
of the model.
The first order conditions have a number of testable implications. If&(O)  > 0,
then there is a wa.ge  rate wkh such that the optimal arrival rate A;,  = 0 for
w 2 wkh.  If  e .g.  cif(0)  > c&(O), th en the employed with a wage w 2 wkf
will only use the informal channel to obtain job offers. Differentiating (17) with
respect to w we obtain
Since W’(w) > 0, this implies that the arrival rate decreases with the wage.
* Moreover, the right-hand side of this equation only depends on model parameters
and on w.
‘The  case in which a single search method is used is a corner solution.
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The effect of a change in the marginal search costs can be obtained by specify-
ing equation (2.14) as ckh  = +ykhckh(Akh)  with 7kh a constant. Upon differentiating
(17) with respect to 7ef  we find
so that
(21)
i.e. an increase in the marginal cost of obtaining an offer from a channel results
in a lower arrival rate. This implication will be tested in Section 5.
Finally, if the cost functions do not depend on the labor market position, then
it is easily seen from equations (15) to (18) that
and hence r = b.
Denote
qkh  =
Cih(Xkh)  Xkh  _ ~ln4ch(~kh)
CidXkh)  - d  111  A,,
Dividing (19) by (17) we obtain
%f %f W’(w)--=-
4,  f3J EF(W(4  - W(w)la:  2  w)
(23)
(24)
in which E,  indicates integration with respect to dF(sjx  2 w). Hence, we have
d In A,, ww4  - W4I~  2 4 %g
d In A,, = wV4  - WW)l~  2 4 %f
(25)
From this we conclude that a sufficient condition for the ratio A,,/&,  to be
independent of w is
F(zlx  2 w) = G(zlx  2 w) (26)
and
77eg  = %f
9
(27)
Hence the equality of the truncated offer distributions is not sufficient for the
composition of wage offers to be independent of w.  This is to be expected, since
costs as well as returns affect the optimal search intensities.
Because the optimal arrival rates depend on w,  we do not have a closed form
solution for W(w)  and hence not for T. This poses problems in the structural
estimation of the model with endogenous arrival rates. In the empirical analysis
we shall test whether the second (informal) method is endogenous by testing
observable implications of the model with choice of arrival rates.
3  T h e  d a t a
The data set we use is taken from the OSA (Netherlands Organization of Strategic
Labor Market Research) Panel. The OSA collects extensive information on labor
market histories of a random sample of households. The survey concentrates on
individuals who are between 15 and 61 years of age, and who are not full-time
students. Therefore only households with at least one person in this category
are included. All individuals (and in all cases the head of the household) in this
category are interviewed. Presently four waves are available (April-May 1985,
August-October 1986, August-November 1988, and August-November 1990). The
first wave consists of 4020 individuals (in 2132 households). In 1990, 1384 (34%)
of these individuals are still in the panel. In the waves of 1986, 1988 and 1990
refreshment samples are drawn, so that in 1990 the sample size is 4438 individuals.
The information on the labor market histories of the respondents consists of
a sequence of labor market states and the sojourn times in these states. The
following labor market states are distinguished: employment (job-to-job transi-
tions are recorded), self-employment, unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force.
The latter group consists of homemakers, conscripts, full-time students and per-
sons with other positions that are not related to the labor market. A number
of variables that give a more detailed description of the various positions is also
recorded, notably income3 (net wages for the employed) and occupation. Part of
the information is retrospective. In the first wave of April-May 1985 respondents
were asked for their labor market histories from January 1, 1980 until the date of
the first interview. We also have information on individual characteristics (age,
nationality, gender, education level) at the time of the first interview of the re-
spondent, and an attempt was made to keep track of changes in time-varyinga
31ncome  changes at transitions before the date of the first interview are only recorded to
lie in one of a few broad intervals. So income in positions occupied before the first interview is
reported inaccurately relative to income in later positions, which is not categorized.
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.characteristics like family composition, marital status and level of education.
The data set provides two types of information on search methods. The first
type concerns the search method that is currently used. In each wave individuals
are asked if they are searching for a job, and, if so, what search methods they use.
Moreover, they are asked to rank the methods in order of importance. There are
two problems with the use of this information. First, the translation of categories
like ‘most important’, ‘second most important’, etc. to search intensities is not
straightforward. Second, for the employed there is an ambiguity in the question
that makes it unclear whether the reported search methods were used to obtain
the current job or whether they are used to obtain a future job. For that reason, we
use a second type of information on search methods. In each wave, the employed
individuals are asked by which sea.rch  method they obtained their current job. The
information is retrospective and has all the problems that come with retrospective
questions. For instance, if more than one job is found between the interviews,
only the search method for the last job is reported, and the search method for
the previous jobs is missing.
In our model we distinguish between formal and informal search methods.
Some authors consider more categories. For instance, Lindeboom, Van Ours and
Renes (1994) distinguish between advertisements, the employment office and in-
formal methods. We classify the first two methods as formal. Informal search
methods involve referral by other employees, so they employ the social network
of the job seeker. Examples are job offers obtained through the former job, school,
a position as trainee, volunteer work, work while retaining unemployment benefit
etc. The OSA panel also contains information on the social network of individ-
uals, which may be of importance for the use of the informal search method. In
particular, respondents are asked to classify their number of friends and acquain-
tances as (1) very large, (2) quite a lot, (3) not that much/normal, (4) a few
or (5) none. We use this information to create a simple social network indicator
which is one if the response to this question equals (1) or (2) and zero otherwise.
In this paper we restrict attention to the respondents who were either working
or unemployed at the time of the first interview. Note that this first interview is
not always in 1985, as refreshment samples are drawn in 1986, 1988 and 1990.
Individuals who were self-employed for some period during the time span covered
by the survey are omitted, as well as respondents who are observed to be working
in a part-time job or who are observed to be a nonparticipant for some period.
The reason is that the model of Section 2 only allows for unemployment-job,
job-job and job-unemployment transitions. Employed individuals whose wage at
the date of the first interview is missing, are omitted. Finally, since almost all
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information on accepted wages and sea.rch  methods comes from individuals who
are younger than 39 years of age, we only consider this group. This leaves us with
2068 individuals.
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for the full sample and the sub-
sample which is used to estimate the model. The exclusion of respondents who
at some moment are observed to be self-employed, nonparticipant, or part-time
employee, or are older than 38 years results in a sample that is younger, predom-
inantly male, higher educated, has a higher occupation level, and a somewhat
lower net income. Note that the fraction of unemployed individuals among those
who are either unemployed or hold a full-time job in the full sample does not
differ from the corresponding fraction in the subsample.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the unemployment and job durations.
The fraction of left censored spells is the fraction of spells that is in progress at
the date of the first interview.
Table 3 contains some descriptive statistics on the relation between search
method, accepted wages and job durations in the subsample. From this table, we
see that on average wages of jobs found by referral are higher than those found
by application. This is true both at the time of the first interview, and for the
wages accepted during the observation period, although the latter difference is
smaller and not significant. It should be noted that the search method reported
in the first interview need not be the method that was used to obtain the job
held at that date, and that the cross-section distribution of wa.ges  differs from the
wage offer distribution. Because high wages are more likely in the cross-section,
we expect a larger difference for the cross-sectional distribution than for the dis-
tribution of accepted wages. The higher wage of jobs found with informal search
need not imply that wage offers are indeed higher for that search method. First,
the reservation wages (r for the unemployed and the current wage for the em-
ployed) vary in the sample, so that the distribution of accepted wages may differ
substantially from the wage offer distribution. Secondly, individuals with charac-
teristics that make them more likely to obtain informal offers may also receive
better wage offers. The correlation through the (unobserved) characteristics of
the individual is magnified in the cross-section at the time of the first interview
because individuals with higher wa.ges  are overrepresented in the cross-section.
The effect of individual heterogeneity is also apparent from the difference in the
fraction of jobs found by the informal search method in the cross-section and
among the accepted jobs. In the cross-section the difference is magnified if the
jobs found by referral have a shorter duration than those found by application.
The last row indicates that this may indeed be the case. The empirical model
12
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Table 1: Comparison of the full sample and the subsample used in the estima-
tion of the model
13
full sample subsample
mean st .dev mean st  .dev
of mean of mean
Age 36.6 0.14 31.2 0.20
Male 0.50 0.0055 0.61 0.011
Education Level’
- Primary/lower sec. 0.46 0.0056 0.37 0.011
- Intermediate 0.37 0.0054 0.41 0.011
- Higher 0.13 0.0038 0.18 0.0085
- University 0.031 0.0019 0.042 0.0044
Job Level”
- Un/semi-skilled 0.48 0.0055 0.23 0.0092
- Skilled 0.30 0.0051 0.50 0.011
- Semi-specialized 0 .077  0 .0029 0.12 0.0072
- Specialized 0.14 0.0039 0.15 0.0079
Working week (hours) 37.7 0.17 38.2 0.26
Labor market position
- Unemployed 0 .070  0 .0028 0.12 0.0073
- Full-time job 0.53 0.0057 0.88 0.0073
- Part-time job 0 .083  0 .0030
- Self-employed 0 .038  0 .0021
- Not-in-labor-force 0.28 0.0050
Individual net income (guilders/month) 1783 12.5 1728 18.4
Marital  Status
- Married/cohab. 0.76 0.0047 0.68 0.010
- Single 0.24 0.0047 0.32 0.010
Number of observations 8121 2068
‘Education Level: Primary/lower secondary means that the attained level of education is
at most lower secondary, either in the general stream (MAVO or at most 3 years of HAVO
or VWO) or the vocational stream (LBO). Intermediate means that the attained education
level is secondary, again either in the general stream (completed HAVO or VWO) or the
vocational stream (MBO). High er is the level attained after a higher vocational (HBO) or
incomplete college training, and University refers to college graduates.
. *Occupational level: classification of the Department of Social Affairs. The distinction
between semi-specialized and specialized jobs is based on the required level of theoretical
knowledge: considerable for semi-specialized and very considerable/scientific for specialized
jobs.
-
Table 2: Unemployment and job durations; durations in months
unemployment job
durations durations
Fraction left-censored
Fraction right-censored
Fraction transition to
Other Job
Unemployment
Average duration
0.43 0.29
0.49 0.44
0.90
0.10
22.6 52.6
Table 3: Accepted jobs found by formal/informal (O/l) method; wages in
guilders/month, durations in months
Wage at time of first interview
Accepted wages while employed
Search method for job at first int.
Search method for accepted jobs
1801 24.0 1944 27.0
2063 103.0 2135 96.1
0.46 0.016 0.54 0.016
0.41 0.047 0.59 0.047
while employed
Average job spell at time first int. 54.0 52.1
Extensive social network 0.62 0.011 0.70 0.011
formal method informal method
mean st.dev mean st .dev
of mean of mean
.
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4 Empirical implementation
4.1 Identification
The unknown entities of the economic model of Section 2 are A,,,  XUg,  A,, , Xeg,
6,  p,  and the wage offer distributions F and G. In this subsection we consider
whether these are identified from the data at hand. For the moment we assume
that the population consists of identical individuals in a homogeneous labor mar-
ket, and we ignore measurement errors. In addition, for the moment, we treat
T as a parameter (later on we verify that the behavioral equation for r does
not contain additional identifying information), so that p disappears from the
. model. The data basically consist of wages, durations and transitions. The wage
data are accepted wages by the employed or unemployed, where we know which
search method generated the accepted job. We also have data on wages in a cross-
section of workers (at the time of the first interview). The accepted wages of the
15
that is specified in Section 4 takes account of these selectivity issues, so that we
obtain an unbiased test of the equality of the wage offer distributions.
The last row shows tha.t  job seekers who during the observation period find a
job by referral have indeed a more extensive social network than job seekers who
find a job by a formal search method. This is used in Section 5 in a test for the
endogeneity of search methods.
Evidence on the use of search methods in consecutive jobs is given in Table
4. For individuals with two job spells during the observation period we give
the fraction that uses the same search method on both occasions. Note that
the persistence is somewhat larger for individuals who use the informal method.
However, a substantial fraction of job seekers obtains a job with a different search
method. This is in line with our economic model.
Table 4: Fraction of subsequent jobs found by formal/informal (O/l) method
search method job search method of
at first interview subsequent job
formal 0.45 (0.088)
informal 0.76 (0.060)
all 0.62 (0.058)
unemployed are drawings from F(w( w > r in case of a wage offer found with_ )
the formal search method and G(zulu,  2 r) in case of a wage offer found with the
informal method. If w,,  denotes the previous wage, then the accepted wages of
the employed are drawings from F(wlw  2 wO)  and G(urlw  > UJ,,),  respectively.
Note that w,,  necessarily exceeds r, since wa  has been accepted at an earlier in-
stant. Now consider wages in a cross-section of workers. These wages also exceed
T.  However, without imposing steady state conditions as in equilibrium models
(see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg (1997)), we cannot relate the distribution of
these wages to the wage offer distribution. Somewhat arbitrarily, we denote the
distribution of cross-sectional wages by K(wlw  2 r).
The duration data consist of unemployment durations and job durations. The
model of Section 2 implies that these durations follow exponential distributions
(of course, in case of job durations, we have to condition on the current wage).
More precisely, taking into account the search method by which the (next) job
is found, we have competing risks with constant exit-specific hazards. For the
unemployment durations these hazards are given in equations (7): 8,,  = AUrF(r)
and 8,,  = &G(r).  For the job d urations these hazards are given by equations
(8),  which can be rewritten as
We are now in a position to discuss the identification of the model. It is
well known that, without additional assumptions or additional information, the
wage offer distribution and the job offer arrival rate are not identified in the
empirical analysis of job search models (Flinn and Heckman  (1982)). Basically,
it is not possible to distinguish between (i)  a large job offer arrival rate and
a small acceptance probability (of the unemployed), and (ii)  a small job offer
arrival rate and a large acceptance probability. Only the product of the arrival
rate and the acceptance probability is identified. In our model this problem is
manifest for both search methods, as is clear from the expressions above. We can
only identify A,,F(r),  XU9c(r),  X,,F(r),  &C(T),  S,  7‘ (which is basically identified
from the smallest wage in the data), and the truncated distributions F(w\w  2 r)
and G(wlw 2 r).
The difference EF(~I~  > r) -  E&w[w  > r) of the conditional means summa-
rizes the differences between the distributions of acceptable wages, and as such
it is a parameter of interest. However, if the conditional mean associated with F
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exceeds that of G hut the acceptance probabili ty for F falls short  of that for G,
then obviously this has different implications than if the orderings of conditional
means and acceptance probabilities are the same. For example, in the former case,
a policy subsidizing the use of formal search methods would not be as fruitful as
it would be in the latter case.
In the a,ppendix to this paper we digress on the relation between the con-
ditional mean and the acceptance probability, in a general class of probabil-
ity distributions. This is used to relate the sign of F(r)  -  c(r)  to the sign of
EF(~Iw  > r) -  EG(wlw  > r),  if F and G belong to this general class of functions.
It turns out that, in this general class, the acceptance probability and the condi-
tional mean of two distributions always satisfy the same ordering. This result is
useful when interpreting the estimation results. Assume that both F and G be-
long to this general class of functions. If it is observed that the conditional mean
of F exceeds that of G, then the acceptance probability for F also exceeds that
for G, so job offers from F will be turned down less frequently. This means that
any observed difference in the conditional mean wages provides a conservative
estimate of the relative attractiveness of the formal search method. The opposite
holds if the conditional mean of G exceeds that of F. The parametric families of
distributions for R’  and G that we adopt in the empirical analysis are such that
F and G always belong to this general class of functions (see Subsection 4.2 and
the appendix).
It is important to stress that the analysis in the appendix is not related to
the so-called recoverubl.Zity  issue, which is of importance in the identification of
search models (Flinn  and Heckman  (1982)). Suppose that we assume that both
F and G belong to specific families of distributions that are not closed under
truncation4.  Then both F and G are fully identified (“recoverable”) from their
truncated versions F(wlw  2 r) and G(wlw 2 r).  As a result, in that case, the
acceptance probabilities F(r)  and c(r)  and the job offer arrival rates X,,,  X,,  , X,,
and X,,  are identified as well. The parametric families of distributions for F and
G that we adopt in the empirical analysis below are not closed under truncation,
so both distributions are recoverable. Hence, the full model is identified. It is
however clear that the estimation results will be extremely sensitive to arbitrary
functional form restrictions concerning F and G. We therefore choose not to
exploit this in the empirical analysis.
So far we have assumed that all individuals are identical. In Section 5 we
4A parametric family of distributions F(w;  6), 0 E 0 is closed under truncation if for all ~1  #
r2 there are parameter vectors 81  and 02 such that F(wjw  2 rl; e,) G qwlw  2 r2; e,)  v w 2
max(rl, Q)
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exploit heterogeneity across individuals in order to test the null hypothesis that
F(r)  and C(r)  are equal. We also exploit this heterogeneity to test whether these
acceptance probabilities are equal to one. The latter seems to be an empirical
regularity (see for example Devine and Kiefer  (1991) for a survey). In that case,
truncated a.nd  untruncated wage offer distributions are identical.
Finally the reservation wage equation in (6) can be rewritten in terms of
identified quantities.
(29)
Hence p can be identified, irrespective of whether F and G are recoverable.
4 . 2  Parameterization _
This subsection deals with two types of parameterization. First, we specify para-
metric functional forms for the wa.ge  (offer) distributions which are faced by the
individual searcher. Secondly, to capture the way in which the economic (struc-
tural) parameters vary across different individuals, we write them as regression-
like functions of individual characteristics. In both cases, we only parameterize
and estimate economic parameters that are identified. We do not pretend to es-
timate the job offer arrival rates or the probability masses below the reservation
wage r. As noted in the introduction, such an approach to the parameterization
of the job search model is novel.
Throughout most of the empirical analysis we assume that the individual
F(wlw  > r),  G(wlur  > r) and K(wlw  > r) are trunsposedlognormal distributions.
In particular, we assume that the random variables associated with F(wlw  > r),
G(wlzu  >  r) a n d  K(wlw  >  )r can be written as the sum of r and a random
variable that is lognormally distributed. Thus, the corresponding densities are
obtained by shifting lognormal densities to the right such that the lower bound
of the support moves from 0 to T. Note that these are specifications for the
truncated wage (offer) distributions, so we do not rule out that the untruncated
distributions have probability mass below r.
a The parameters of the economic model may vary across individuals. Let a
vector 2 of observed individua.1  characteristics summarize the individual hetero-
geneity in the data. We distinguish between three age categories (16-22, 23-
29, 30-3S),  three levels of education (primary/lower secondary, intermediate,
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higher/university) and three job levels (un/semi-skilled, skilled, (semi-)specialized)‘.
For our purposes, it is appealing to interpret these characteristics as defining sep-
arate segments of the labor market. Note that equilibrium search models predict
that if workers within a segment a.re  homogeneous, then firms set wages such that
the unemployed always accept all wa.ge  offers, so that the acceptance probabilities
for the unemployed are equal to one (see Ridder and Van den Berg (1997) and
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (1997)).
The data set is not sufficiently large to estimate the model separately for
different subsets of homogeneous individuals. We therefore estimate a parame-
terized model in which the economic parameters are written as regression-like
functions of individual characteristics. For computational and expositional con-
venience, these parameterizations are specified as linear or log-linear functions of
5, so we do not allow for interaction effects.
The parameters of the transposed lognormal wage (offer) distributions are pu,
and r~i,  h = F,  G, Ii’,  where we specify that
cl/l  = Yh  + +/‘a: (30)
while oh  is assumed to be independent of z.
The identified transition rates are specified as log-linear in the individual
characteristics. For the rates into and out of unemployment this gives
8uf = 4Pof + P+)
8w = exp(POg  + $4 (31)
8eu = exp(&6 + Pl;4
These parameterizations are supposed to capture the way in which the corre-
sponding economic entities (&,F(r),  XUgc(r)  and S) vary across individuals.
From equations (7) and (2s)  it follows that the channel-specific exit rates out
of a job with a wage w can be expressed as
Now define 8,.  and O,,  simply as the exit rates out of a job with a wage equal
- to r, so e.g. 8,, := e,,(r)  = (&,/&,>euj.  We specify (&&L~>  as exdP,~L  and
(X,,/X,,)  as exp(P,,).  As a result,
‘See Table 1 for an explanation of these categories.
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8 ef = exP(Poj +P;x +Pej> (32)
0 =eg exd&,  + Pi" + Peg)
Alternatively, one could specify (X, j/X,,) and (X,,/X,,)  as log-linear regression-
like functions of 2. Then the coefficients associated with z in equations (32)
would be different from pj  and pg. For practical reasons we do not pursue such
a parameterization.
Equations (32) complete the parameterization of the transition rates given r.
For example, the transition rate e,,(w)  is now specified as O,jF(zulw  > r),  with
8ej and F as specified above.
At this stage it is useful to mention that we use a two-stage procedure to
estimate the model. In the first stage we estimate the transition rates and the pa-
rameters of the wage (offer) distributions. Moreover, in the first stage, we adopt a
parameterization of the reservation wa,ge  T,  which is supposed to capture the vari-
ation in T across heterogeneous individuals, a,nd  we estimate the corresponding
coefficients along with the other parameters,
This equation is not to be confused with the Bellman equation (6) for the optimal
individual reservation wage. The equation above captures variation of reservation
wages across unemployed workers with different characteristics, and it does not
impose the values that are optimal according to the theoretical model.
As a result, in the first estimation stage, the empirical specification for the
exit rate out of unemployment is equivalent to a reduced-form specification. Note
however that the empirical specifications above for the transition rates from one
job to another are structural in the sense that they impose optimal behavior of
employed workers. We exploit the equation for the optimal reservation wage in
the second estimation sta.ge,  and we exploit variation in structural determinants
of r across individuals for further inference in Subsection 5.2. In particular, in
the second estimation stage, we estimate p from the empirical version (29) of the
Bellman equation for the reservation wa.ge.  The solution of this equation for p
will be different for individuals with different 2, and we adopt nonlinear least
squares to obtain the value which gives the best over-all fit.*
We allow for measurement error in the (accepted) wages. There is ample
evidence that the wages in the OSA panel are measured with error (see e.g.
Hartog and Van Ophem (1991)). M oreover,  if we do not allow for measurement
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error, the reservation wage 7‘ is estimated as the sample minimum of the observed
(accepted) wages and this estimator can be severely biased if wages are measured
with error. We assume that the measurement error is multiplicative so that the
observed (accepted) wa.ges  are given by
6 = we (34)
with
in which we normalize p,  such that E(E)=~.  The measurement errors of the wages
of consecutive jobs are assumed to be independent.
Now let us briefly discuss the construction of individual likelihood contribu-
tions in the first estimation stage. The economic model implies that unemploy-
ment durations and job durations are exponentially distributed. This simplifies
the derivation of the likelihood function of the observed labor market histories
considerably (Ridder (1984)). We use the following information: the labor mar-
ket position (job or unemployed) at the date of the first interview, the elapsed
duration in that position, and the remaining duration in that position. If the
position is left before the end of the observation period, then we observe the type
of transition (job-to-job by formal or informal method, job-to-unemployment,
unemployment-to-job by formal or informal method) and the time spent in the
new position. We follow the individuals to the end of the observation period or
until the end of the second spell, and in the latter case we observe the type of
transition at the end of the second spell. The number of transitions is limited to
two for computational reasons: the dimension of the numerical integration of the
measurement errors is equal to the number of consecutive job spells.
The elapsed and residual unemployment durations at the time of the first
interview are stochastically independent and exponentially distributed with pa-
rameter 8,,  + O,,. A subsequent transition to a job found by a formal method
has probability O,,/(O,,  + O,,). The e a se1 p d and residual job duration at the time
of the first interview are independently exponentially distributed with parameter
&f(%)  + leg  + 61 with we  the wage at the first interview, which is itself dis-
tributed according to K(wlw  > r).  A subsequent transition to a higher paying
job found by a formal method has probability
21
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with simi1a.r  proba.bilities for the other two possible transitions. The wage in the
next job has density
(37)
if found by a formal search method and density
if found by an informal search method. The new job spell is exponentially dis-
tributed with parameter 8,,  (wr  ) + 13~~  (wr  ) + 6. A subsequent unemployment spell
follows an exponential distribution with parameter 8,,  + 19,~.  The full individual
likelihood contribution is subsequently obtained by integration with respect to
the joint distribution of measurement errors of the observed wages (see Van den
Berg and Ridder (1997) for details).6
Now let us turn to the second estimation step. The objective function to be
minimized here is defined as
CY(F;  -  ?;  -  q n = 27 (39)
Here, the subscript i refers to the type of individual. Since we use three indi-
vidual characteristics with three possible values each, we distinguish between 27
different types of individuals. The variable 1’;  is the estimated type-specific reser-
vation wage from the first estimation step, while Fj  is the reservation wage that
follows from the behavioral reservation wage equation (29). The only unknown
parameter in the latter equation is p. We introduce an additional unknown pa-
rameter z in the objective function (see above). If the behavioral equation for r is
correctly specified then z is zero. Allowing for z # 0 therefore provides a natural
specification test of the model. The benefits level bi is taken to be the mean of
unemployment benefits for all individuals with similar 5 who are unemployed at
the first interview.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Parameter estimates
- Tables 5 to 7 present the parameter estimates for the empirical model. The unit
time period is one month. Table 8 presents implied values of the transition rates,
6The likelihood function was maximized with the BFGS algorithm. The integrals were ob-
tained by the Gauss-Legendre algorithm. All computations were performed in GAUSS.
the conditional mean of the wage (offer) distributions and the reservation wage.
We start by discussing the parameter estimates for the transition rates, which
are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Parameter estimates: transition rates (standard errors)
variable/parameter formal informal
Job finding rate by search method
constant
age category 23-29
age category 30-38
intermediate education
higher education/university
job level: skilled
job level: (semi)-specialized
extensive social network
employed
-3.73 (0.28)
-0.49 (0.13)
-1.11 (0.13)
0.20 (0.10)
0.82 (0.13)
0.32 (0.12)
0.19 (0.14)
-0.021 (0.10)
0.32 (0.25)
Lay08  rate
constant -4.64 (0.28)
age category 23-29 -0.41 (0.27)
age category 30-38 -0.63 (0.26)
intermediate education -0.64 (0.22)
higher education/university -0.50 (0.30)
occupation level: skilled -0.076 (0.22)
occupation level: (semi-)specialized  -0.012 (0.30)
-2.89 (0.19)
-0.74 (0.094)
-1.40 (0.098)
0.059 (0.080)
0.18 (0.12)
-0.20 (0.084)
-0.11 (0.11)
-0.035 (0.084)
0.44 (0.22)
The parameters indicate how the product of the acceptance probability and
the arrival rate varies over the population. Although a structural interpretation is
impossible, some interesting patterns emerge. First, as usual, the transition rates
decrease with age. For the formal search method, the transition intensity increases
- with the level of education. This is not t,rue  for the informal search method. The
arrival rate is somewhat larger for the employed, but only significantly for the
informal search method.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates: wage (offer) distributions and the reservation wage;
wages in 1000 guilders/month  (standard errors)
variable/parameter coefficient standard error
Wage (o$er)  distributions
PF
PG
PIi
a.ge  category 23-29
age category 30-38
intermediate education
higher education/university
occupation level: skilled
occupation level: (semi-)specialized
Reservation wage
constant
age category 23-29
age category 30-38
intermediate education
higher education/university
occupation level: skilled
occupation level: (semi-)specialized
-Log Likelihood = 34131.2
6.00 (0.30)
6.16 (0.27)
6.15 (0.26)
0.11 (0.11)
0.56 (0.093)
o.os9 (0.066)
0.27 (0.076)
0.038 (0.079)
0.47 (0.10)
0.42 (0.10)
0.41 (0.094)
0.26 (0.046)
0.18 (0.0048)
6.59 (0.17)
0.42 (0.072)
0.29 (0.083)
0.025 (0.050)
0.02s (0.071)
0.040 (0.059)
-0.17 (0.12)
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Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for the wage (offer) distributions
and the reservation wage equation. Most of the parameter estimates of the wage
(offer) distributions are in accordance with intuition. Wages increase with age,
educational level and occupational level. The key estimation result is that the hy-
pothesis that the truncated wage offer distributions are equal cannot be rejected.
The null hypotheses p F = ~1~  and crF  = bG  cannot be rejected in a Wald test.
This is confirmed if we perform a Likelihood Ratio test on the two restrictions.
The test statistic equals 4.05 (&J2)  = 4.61).
Generally, the estimated reservation wages are close to and even below the
benefit level. Since the benefits level is often smaller than the mandatory mini-
mum wage, this is a first indication that there are few, if any, wage offers below
the reservation wage.
We investigated the robustness of the results by including additional indepen-
dent variables, like marital status, gender, and the number of individuals working
in the household. The estimates of the parameters of the wage offer distributions
are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables.
Furthermore, the results are robust to changes in the lower bound of the
support of the wage offer distributions. We re-estimated the model where the
lower bound of the support of the wage (offer) distributions is set equal to the
reservation wa.ge  minus a fixed amount. As a result, the acceptance probabilities
are positive, and the density of the untruncated wage (offer) distributions is
not a priori restricted to equal zero at the reservation wage. For various fixed
lower bounds (r -  100,~ -  250, r -  400),  the hypothesis that both wage offer
distributions are equal is not rejected. Further, the fit of the model deteriorates
if the lower bound is decreased (the log-likelihood values are -34131.2, -34141.7
and -34143.4, respectively). The parameters of the transition rates are unaffected
by these changes.
Table 7 reports the parameter estimate of the discount rate that is obtained
in the second stage of the estimation. The estimate implies a discount rate of
13% per year. This result is similar to estimates in other structural analyses
of job search (e.g. Van den Berg (1990a) estimates a discount rate of 12%).
The estimated constant z is significant. We conclude that the reservation wage
condition as stated in equation (6) is not valid. We can interpret this result in two
ways. First, it may be that the nonpecuniary utility of unemployment is positive,
and that this utility term can be expressed by an additive and constant utility
* flow with monetary value z.  In that case the utility flow from being unemployed
equals b  + Z.  A second explanation derives from the fact that the reservation
wage may be smaller than the lower bound of the support of the wage (offer)
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Table 7: Parameter estimates: the subjective discount rate
para.meter coefficient standard error
p (subjective rate of discount)
t (constant term)
Standard error sum of sctuares
0.011
179.4
189.9
(o.ooa6)
(69.8)
(185.5)
distributions. In that case the estimated lower bound in the first stage is larger
than r, and the estimate of z will be positive.
5.2 How frequently do the unemployed reject job offers,
and are search intensities endogenous?
As argued in Section 4, if the truncated wage offer distributions are equal then
the untruncated wage offer distributions are not necessarily equal. In particular,
we cannot infer whether the acceptance probabilities F(r)  and c(r)  are equal.
Now, from the robustness checks in the previous subsection it appears that the
reservation wa.ge  does not exceed the lower bound of the support of the wage offer
distributions (recall that the fit of the model does not improve if we allow the
reservation wage to exceed the lower bound of the support of the wage offer dis-
tributions). So, under the untestable functional form assumptions we made there,
we may conclude that both acceptance probabilities are equal to one. However,
instead of relying on the recoverability of the accepted wage offer distributions, or
on the fact that the estimated reservation wages are generally below the manda-
tory minimum wage, we propose an alternative test of the hypothesis that the
acceptance probabilities are equal (and, in particular, that they are equal to one).
This test exploits heterogeneity across individuals.7
Consider individuals who differ in terms of their unemployment benefits level
b. The exit rate out of unemployment depends on b only by way of the reservation
a 7An  untruncated distribution can be identified from truncated versions of it if there is
sufficient independent variation in the truncation point (which in our case is the reservation
wage); see Woodroofe (1985).
2 6
Table 8: Implications of parameter estimates, unit time period is one month
Age category
age category 16-22 23-29 30-38  a v e r a g e
&A, (4 0.034 0.026 0.014 0.022
t&) 0.049 0.025 0.013 0.024
k,(r) 0.047 0.035 0.019 0.030
kg  (4 0.076 0.038 0.020 0.037
5 0.0071 0.0043 0.0035 0.0045
w+J 2 4 1247 1755 2021 1778
&&4~~ > 4 1333 1867 2202 1915
r 744 1096 956 971
b 841 1136 1314 1160
Level of educatio72
level of education 1 2 3
6, (4 0.017 0.021 0.033
4Lg  b-1 0.025 0.024 0.022
&, (1’) 0.024 0.028 0.045
kg (4 0.039 0.037 0.034
6 0.0065 0.0033 0.0035
&+JIw 2 4 1595 1756 2123
E&h L r> 1702 lSS6 2322
r 963 987 952
b 1158 1165 1152
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wage. The unemployment benefits affect the reservation wage of unemployed
workers, which in turn affects the probability that a job offer is accepted. From
the model we derive the following elasticities of the exit rate out of unemployment
with respect. to the benefits level:
d In  dzlr g(r)  dlnr
d l n b  =
ftd  $‘“”  aIld  dln’ug
F(r)  dlnb ~ = - -(T)‘dlnb81x1  b (40)
Under the null hypothesis that F(w) = G( )20  on w  E  (0, r-1,  both elasticities are
equal. Indeed, sufficient for the equality of the elasticities is that the acceptance
probabilities F;(r)  and ??(  )r are equal and that the densities f and g have the
same value at T.  In conclusion, by comparing the way in which exit rates out of
unemployment for the two search channels differ across individuals with different
b, we can test whether F(r)  = F(r).
Now consider the null hypothesis that the acceptance probabilities are equal
to one for all unemployed workers (that is, for all possible values of b in the
population). More precisely, we hypothesize that the reservation wage is strictly
smaller than the smallest wage offer in the market for all unemployed workers.
Then obviously f(r) = g(r) = 0, and the elasticities above are zero. Thus, by
observing whether the exit rates  out of unemployment do not vary with b, we can
test whether acceptance probabilities are equal to one.
A number of comments are in order. First of all, in reality we do not observe
infinitesimal changes of b, so we ha.ve  to assume tl1a.t  the elasticities behave as
required on a certain interval for T.  Secondly, we do not re-estimate the model
including the behavioral equation for r in order to obtain an estimate of the effect
of b on the exit rates. The result of such a procedure would be heavily dependent
on the ad-hoc functional-form specifications of F and G (see e.g. Van den Berg
(1990b)).  Instead, we include log b as a regressor in 19~~  and 8,,  (see equations (31))
and we re-estimate these rates with the unemployment duration data. Thirdly,
these tests do not have a large power against certain alternative hypotheses. For
example, the supports of F and G may have gaps, e.g. for institutional reasons. If
r is located in a common gap, then both elasticities a.re  zero even if neither of the
null hypotheses is true. On the other hand, if search intensities are endogenously
chosen then, according to Subsection 2.2, b affects the optimal values of the search
intensities, and therefore it affects the transition rates.
Now let us turn to the results of these tests. The estimated elasticities equal
- 0 . 0 1  ( 0 . 4 9 ) and 0.45 (0.4S),  for the formal and the informal job finding rate,
respectively. Both the Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio test indicate that the
hypothesis that the elasticities are equal can not be rejected. The hypothesis that
2s
both elasticities are zero ca.n not be rejected either (~22  = 1.S5 < 4.60 = ~&s,,).~
These results fully support the hypothesis that both acceptance probabilities are
equal to one, so that the truncated and untruncated distributions coincide. Note
that a reservation wage which is lower than the lower bound of the support of u,
is explains the significance of z in the second step in the estimation of the model;
apparently, the true reservation wa,ge  is not identified from the wage data.
To test for endogeneity of the use of search methods, we use the social network
dummy variable. The extent of the social network of individuals is likely to affect
the costs of using the informal channel, but not the returns, apart from any
difference between F and G. If the arrival rate of informal job offers is affected
by the optimally chosen search intensity, then such an indicator of search costs
should affect the job offer arrival rates, and hence the transition rates to (other)
jobs. We include the social network indicator as an additional regressor in these
transition rates. It turns out that the corresponding coefficient is insignificant in
each transition rate. This lends credence to the model in which the arrival rates
of formal and informal job offers are exogenous (more precisely, workers with
identical labor market characteristics choose a common maximum search effort
that is exogenously determined).
To summarize, in this subsection we have designed and applied some tests that
exploit heterogeneity across individuals. The results indicate that search effort is
exogenous. Moreover, job offer acceptance probabilities of the unemployed seem to
be equal to one, and truncated and untruncated wage offer distributions coincide.
Since there is no evidence that the use of search channels is endogenous, and
from the finding that both wage offer distributions do not differ systematically,
we conclude that the type of search method used is an irrelevant feature attached
to a wage offer. For current labor market participants, a job found by means of
one particular channel is not different in any relevant way from a job found by
means of the other channel. This does not preclude that a social planner may gain
efficiency by subsidizing one channel over the other. Any insights into the latter
would require the quantification of various additional aspects of the process by
which workers and firms are matched, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a structural empirical analysis of job search along formal and.
informal search channels. We have estimated a job search model in which offers
‘This result is fully in accordance to the extensive empirical literature of the effect of b on
unemployment durations in The Netherlands; see Van den Berg (1990b)  for a survey.
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arrive by way of t,hese  two channels, and in which the wage offer distribution is
allowed to depend on the search method that was used to generate the offer. The
model allows for search during unemployment as well as search on the job.
The estimation results show that the exit rate to (new) jobs along the informal
channel exceeds the exit rate along the formal channel, in unemployment as well
as in employment. Highly educated individuals find jobs relatively often along the
formal channel. Furthermore, employed individuals receive more job offers than
the unemployed. This holds both for formal and informal job offers. The key result
is that we do not find a wage advantage of searching formally or informally. This
result is robust with respect to a number of possible misspecifications of the
model.
The fundamental problem in the identification of the model concerns the fact
that the wage offer distributions cannot be recovered from the distributions of
accepted wages that are truncated at the reservation wage of the unemployed, if
no functional form assumptions are made on the untruncated distributions, and
if the population consists of identical individuals in a homogeneous labor market.
We choose not to rely on the recoverability of arbitrarily chosen functional forms
for these distributions in order to identify the model. Instead, we deal with this
in a variety of other ways, theoretical as well as empirical. For both wage offer
distributions, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the probability masses of
the wage offer distributions below the reservation wage equal zero. We conclude
that the truncated accepted wage distributions equal the untruncated wage offer
distributions. The estimation results also indicate that search effort is exogenous.
In sum, since there is no evidence that the use of search channels is endo-
genous, and from the finding that both wage offer distributions do not differ
systematically, we conclude that the type of search method used to find a job
offer is an irrelevant feature attached to the wage corresponding to that offer.
This conclusion runs a.gainst  predictions in theoretical studies stating that the
informal search method generates job offers with higher wages. Of course, we
can not rule out that the informal method has systematic advantages in terms of
non-wage characteristics of job offers. It would be an interesting topic for further
empirical research to investigate this.
.
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Appendix: The conditional mean and the ac-
ceptance probability
As argued in Section 4, the da.ta  identify the truncated (or conditional) distribu-
tions F(wlw  > r) and G(ru(w  > r) but not the untruncated distributions F(w)
and G(w). In particular, they do identify the conditional means EF(~(~  > r) and
EG(~I~  > r),  but not the acceptance probabilities F(r)  and c(r).  The difference
of the conditional means summarizes the differences between the distributions of
acceptable wages, and as such it is a parameter of interest. However, if the condi-
tional mean associated with F exceeds that of G but the acceptance probability
of F falls short of that of G, then obviously any policy subsidizing the use of
formal search channels would not be as fruitful as it would be if the orderings of
conditional mea,ns  and acceptance probabilities are the same.
In this appendix we digress on the relation between the conditional mean and
the acceptance probability in general classes of probability distributions. We re-
strict attention to distributions of “regular” random variables (i.e., nonnegative,
continuous, with a finite mean etc.). We want to relate the sign of F’(r)  -c(r)  to
the sign of EF(~J~  > r) -  EG(~Jz~  > r).  Note that the first term is nonnegative
for all r > 0 iff F first-order stochastically dominates G. It should however be
noted that first-order stochastic dominance of F over G does not imply first-
order stochastic dominance of F(UJ~W  > r) over G(wlw > r),  Now let $J~(w)
and I,!J~(uJ)  denote the hazard rates associated with F and G, respectively, so for
example $F(w)  = f(w)/F(w).
Result.  U&+4  5 I&(W) for every w > 0 then both F(r)  2 i?(r)  and
EF(wJw > r) 2 EG(wIw  > r),  for every r > 0.
The first part of this result is trivial, since
(see e.g. Lancaster (1990)). The second part follows from the following equality,
E&+J  > r) -  E&U/W  > r) =
(42)
lrn exp (- lw $+-(x)dx) [I- ew (J"' V+(X)  - ti,(+x)] dwr
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which can be obtained by partial integration (see Van den Berg (1994)).
From the equations above it is clear tha.t  both the acceptance probability
inequality and the conditional mean inequality can be translated in terms of the
functions $J~(  20) and gG(w).  However, the former inequality concerns the shape
of these functions on w E (0, r) while the latter concerns the shape on w E  (r,  oo).
Thus, one needs an assumption on the global behavior of +,F  and $G in order to
relate the two inequalities for any r.  (It is obvious that the condition in the result
above is by no mea.ns  necessary.)
The usefulness of the result above is in the following: if one is prepared to
assume that the hazard rate of F is uniformly larger or smaller than that of
G, then the acceptance probabilities and conditional means of F and G satisfy
the same ordering. If it is then observed that the conditional mean of F exceeds
that of G, then the acceptance probability for F also exceeds that for G, so job
offers from F will be turned down less frequently. This means that any observed
difference in the conditional mean wages provides a conservative estimate of the
relative attractiveness of the search method with the highest conditional mean
wage.
Examples of parametric families of distributions for which the parameters
define an unambiguous ranking of the hazard rates are the families of exponen-
tial distributions and Pareto distributions (provided the latter all have the same
support). So, if both F and G are Pareto distributed with the same support, and
if the observed conditional mean of F exceeds that of G, then the acceptance
probability of F also exceeds that of G.
In the empirical analysis of this paper we mostly adopt lognormal specific-
ations for F and G, with parameters (/.L~,  aF)  and (pG,gG),  respectively. The
hazard rates of F and G are equal to
(43)
in which $snr denotes the hazard rate of the standard normal distribution. The
function GSN(  X) is increasing, for all x. Thus, the expression above decreases
in both ~~  and ci.  Let  (TF  = OG.  It  follows that if PF  > (<)pG  then both
P(r)  > (<)c(r)  and EF(wIw > r) > (<)EG(wIw  > T),  for any T > 0. In sum, if
F and G are lognormally distributed with the same Q parameter then the accept-
ance probabilities and conditional means of F and G satisfy the same ordering.
-The  same is true if ~1 rather than cr is assumed to be the same. Note incident-
ally that lognormal distributions are recoverable, so PF  and UF (and therefore
the acceptance probability F(r)) are identified from the truncated distribution
F(ZU/W  > r) with a fixed r (similarly for G).
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Finally, suppose that F and G ha.ve  transposed lognormal distributions. This
parameteriza.tion is also used in the empirical analysis of this paper. The random
variables associated with F and G can then be written as the sum of a common
positive constant a and a random variable that is lognormally distributed with
parameters ( pLF, a) and (/.+,  a), respectively (so their support equals (a, oo)). The
hazard rates of these distributions equal the hazard rates of the corresponding
lognormal distributions evaluated at 20-u  instead of W.  As a result, the transposed
lognormal case has the same properties as the lognormal case.
All in all, it seems justified to conclude that in many cases the acceptance
probability and the conditional mean a.re  either both largest for F or both largest
for G. This result is useful when interpreting the estimation results.
.
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